Over the course of the EconWorks FAANG Antitrust Series, we examined how major digital platforms may influence downstream competition through mechanisms such as:

If competition concerns in digital markets arise through these pathways, then effective remedies may need to address how platforms structure participation—rather than how they price products.

One approach involves behavioral remedies that limit certain platform practices without altering market structure.

Examples may include:

Such remedies may seek to increase user choice, improve developer access, or reduce switching costs while preserving platform integration.

However, critics argue that behavioral remedies may be difficult to monitor—particularly in markets where competitive effects arise through feedback between usage, ranking, or adoption.

An alternative approach involves structural remedies that alter platform organization—for example, separating marketplace operations from retail functions or operating systems from complementary software.

A third approach involves interoperability obligations, such as:

These measures may reduce entry barriers or lock-in effects without requiring full structural separation, though they may also raise implementation challenges related to privacy or security.

As antitrust enforcement in digital markets evolves, policymakers may confront trade-offs between preserving integration benefits and mitigating the competitive effects of platform governance.

Future enforcement efforts may increasingly focus not on breaking up platforms—but on reshaping the rules governing how users, developers, sellers, and creators participate within them.