This is the third post in our EconWorks FAANG Antitrust Series examining recent U.S. antitrust complaints against major digital platforms.

In the first post, we examined how Google’s default agreements may influence which search services consumers use.

In the second, we turned to Apple’s App Store policies—and how platform governance may shape which developers can reach users in the first place.

This post examines Amazon—and how marketplace ranking systems may influence competition by shaping which sellers are seen by consumers.

Competition for Visibility

Amazon operates one of the largest online retail marketplaces in the world.

Unlike traditional retailers, however, the platform does not simply stock products on digital shelves. Instead, it determines:

  • Which sellers appear in response to a search

  • How prominently those sellers are displayed

  • Whether a seller’s offer is featured in the Buy Box

Because many purchases occur through the Buy Box, access to this placement may significantly affect sales outcomes.

In this way, Amazon may influence not only which products are available to consumers—but which sellers receive demand.

From Ranking to Sales

Once a seller’s offer appears prominently on the platform, it may receive a greater share of consumer attention.

Even where multiple sellers offer identical products, differences in:

  • Visibility

  • Placement within search results

  • Eligibility for Buy Box placement

may influence purchasing decisions.

Over time, this may create a feedback loop between:

Ranking → Demand → Sales → Ranking

For new sellers entering the marketplace, limited initial visibility may make it difficult to generate the sales needed to qualify for prominent placement.

Even where entry is technically feasible, reduced access to early demand may influence whether a seller can compete effectively over time.

Why This Case Matters

Unlike traditional retail markets, competition on digital marketplaces may depend not only on product quality or price—but on the allocation of consumer attention by platform ranking systems.

This raises a broader question: Should platform operators be permitted to influence how demand is allocated among competing sellers?

📩 Next in the EconWorks FAANG Series:
Algorithmic Feeds and Competition in Social Media Platforms (Meta)

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