This is the second post in our EconWorks FAANG Antitrust Series.
In the first post, we examined how Google’s default search agreements may influence competition through user behavior. This post turns to Apple—and how platform governance may shape competition by controlling developer access to users.
Unlike the DOJ’s case against Google, which centers on how services are presented to users, the litigation involving Apple concerns the terms under which developers may reach those users in the first place.
To distribute apps on iOS devices, developers must:
Submit their apps for review
Comply with App Store policies
Use Apple’s in-app payment system for certain transactions
Pay commissions on digital purchases
Developers who do not comply may be denied access to the App Store entirely.
In this way, Apple does not simply compete with developers—it governs the terms under which developers may compete on the platform.
From Governance to Competition
App Store policies may influence downstream competition through several channels.
Commission requirements, for example, may increase developers’ marginal costs—affecting pricing decisions and potentially limiting price competition.
Communication rules may also affect whether developers can inform users about alternative purchasing options available outside the platform.
Restrictions on interoperability may further increase switching costs faced by users considering alternative services.
Taken together, such policies may influence:
Entry decisions
Pricing strategies
Product design choices
in downstream app markets.
Competition Beyond Price
Importantly, the alleged harm in this context may not arise through higher prices for the platform itself.
Instead, concerns may center on whether platform governance:
Limits developer competition
Slows innovation
Reduces consumer choice
Constrains pricing alternatives
Critics, however, argue that App Store policies may enhance security, privacy, and platform integrity by maintaining a curated ecosystem.
Why This Case Matters
The litigation involving Apple raises a broader question:
Should platform operators be permitted to control not only access to users—but the terms under which competitors transact with them?
In digital ecosystems, competition may depend not only on product quality or price—but on the rules governing participation in the platform itself.
Next in the EconWorks FAANG Series:
Ranking the Marketplace: Demand Allocation on Amazon
