This post is the first in our EconWorks FAANG Antitrust Series examining recent U.S. antitrust complaints against major digital platforms. We begin with Google—and how default search agreements may influence competition in general search services.
In 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google alleging that the company unlawfully maintained its monopoly in general search services.
But unlike traditional antitrust cases, this one isn’t really about price.
Search services are typically offered to users for free. Instead, the government’s complaint focuses on how Google’s agreements with smartphone manufacturers and wireless carriers may influence which services consumers use—simply by setting Google as the default search engine on their devices.
The Conduct: Competition for Default Placement
At the center of the DOJ’s case are distribution agreements between Google and firms such as:
Smartphone manufacturers
Mobile carriers
Browser developers
In exchange for revenue-sharing payments, these firms agree to preinstall Google Search and set it as the default option on user devices.
While users are generally free to switch search providers, behavioral research suggests that many consumers tend to stick with default settings—even when alternatives are available.
Why Defaults May Matter
Default placement does not restrict consumer choice.
But it may influence consumer behavior.
Once a search engine is preselected on a user’s device, it may receive a greater share of search queries simply because it is already set as the default. Even small behavioral biases toward default options may scale across millions of devices.
Over time, this may translate distribution agreements into:
Increased usage → More behavioral data → Improved search performance
Improved performance, in turn, may reinforce continued reliance on the same service.
From Usage to Quality
As more users rely on the default search engine:
Their queries generate behavioral data
That data can be used to refine ranking algorithms
Improved results may attract even more users
In this way, short-term improvements in product quality may interact with long-term competitive dynamics.
A rival search engine with fewer users may have limited access to comparable data—making it harder to compete on performance even if switching remains technically feasible.
Competition Beyond Price
Importantly, the DOJ does not claim that consumers are paying higher prices for search services.
Instead, the alleged harm may arise indirectly if:
Reduced competition limits meaningful alternatives
Innovation slows
Privacy protections weaken
Critics, however, argue that default agreements may reflect legitimate competition for distribution—and that consumers remain free to choose other services.
Why This Case Matters
The DOJ’s case raises a broader question about how competition works in digital markets:
Is competition determined by price—or by who controls the pathways through which users access services?
For consumers, the outcome may influence not only which services appear by default on their devices—but how competitive digital markets remain in the years ahead.
Next in the EconWorks FAANG Series:
Apple’s App Store Policies and Platform Governance
