This is the fourth post in our EconWorks FAANG Antitrust Series examining recent U.S. antitrust complaints against major digital platforms.
In earlier posts, we examined how:
Google’s default agreements may influence which search services consumers use
Apple’s App Store policies may shape which developers can reach users
Amazon’s marketplace ranking systems may influence which sellers receive demand
This post turns to Meta—and how algorithmic feed curation may influence competition by shaping which content users see.
Competition for Attention
Unlike traditional media platforms, social media feeds are often curated using algorithmic ranking systems.
These systems determine:
Which content appears in a user’s feed
How prominently that content is displayed
Whether certain content is recommended to new users
In this way, Meta may influence not only which content is available—but which content receives attention.
From Visibility to Engagement
Once content appears prominently within a user’s feed, it may receive:
More views
More likes
More shares
More comments
Even where competing creators produce similar content, differences in feed placement may influence downstream engagement.
Over time, this may create a feedback loop between:
Ranking → Engagement → Ranking
For new creators or competing platforms, limited initial visibility may make it difficult to generate the engagement needed for algorithmic promotion.
Even where entry is technically feasible, reduced access to early attention may influence whether content is surfaced to users over time.
Why This Case Matters
Unlike traditional media markets, competition on social platforms may depend not only on content quality—but on how user attention is allocated by algorithmic ranking systems.
This raises a broader question:
Should platform operators be permitted to influence how user attention is allocated among competing content providers?
📩 Next in the EconWorks FAANG Antitrust Series:
Microsoft and the Bundling of Operating Systems and Complementary Software
