This is the fifth post in our EconWorks FAANG Antitrust Series examining recent U.S. antitrust complaints against major digital platforms.
In earlier posts, we examined how:
Google’s default agreements may influence which search services consumers use
Apple’s App Store policies may shape which developers can reach users
Amazon’s marketplace ranking systems may influence which sellers receive demand
Meta’s feed ranking systems may influence which creators receive attention
This post turns to Microsoft—and how operating system integration may influence competition in complementary software markets.
From Integration to Adoption
Microsoft develops and distributes the Windows operating system, which serves as the primary interface through which users interact with software applications on personal computers.
In addition to the operating system itself, Microsoft also develops complementary software products, including:
Web browsers
Productivity suites
Cloud storage services
Communication platforms
These products may be:
Preinstalled
Integrated
Prominently displayed
within the operating system environment.
In this way, Microsoft does not simply compete with independent software developers—it may influence how users access competing applications.
From Adoption to Compatibility
Once software is integrated into an operating system, it may receive greater exposure simply because it is readily accessible.
Even where users may install alternative applications:
Preinstalled software
Default settings
System prompts
may influence adoption decisions.
Applications that are widely adopted may also receive:
More updates
Greater developer support
Broader compatibility
which may reinforce their attractiveness to users over time.
Why This Case Matters
Competition in software markets may depend not only on product quality—but on how operating systems shape the accessibility and adoption of complementary applications.
This raises a broader question:
Should platform operators be permitted to influence adoption through integration?
📩 End of the EconWorks FAANG Antitrust Series
